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understanding Africa today
The achievements of successive Somaliland governments in 
building legitimacy and conducting elections have attracted 
widespread praise. While the near future will present 
substantial challenges to the durability of past successes, 
a close analysis shows that Somaliland offers a great many 
useful lessons about how to build a Somali nation state. 
An established, discursive system of consensus-based 
political participation is as important as democratisation 
through elections. This system is inevitably imperfect, but 
it has played a key role in securing broad, though qualified, 
acceptance of state institutions. 
A resurgence of optimism in southern Somalia has diverted 
attention from more sustained, if less spectacular, political 
accommodations negotiated in Somaliland and elsewhere in 
the Somali Horn of Africa. Mundane lessons learned in these 
territories have once again been relegated to the margins. 
International participants and elite partners in Mogadishu, 
Nairobi, Washington and London are absorbed by Somali 
realpolitik and the apparent progress of a grand technocratic 
exercise in state-building. It is imperative that those wishing 
to support continued political development in Somaliland 
and the region pay greater heed to the historical and cultural 
context in which it is occurring.
By Michael Walls
1
“ ”
North and south, success and disillusionment
Increasing numbers of non-Somalis are taking notice of 
Somaliland. In part, this has come about through involvement 
with, or awareness of, events such as the International Book Fair in 
Hargeysa, capital of the internationally unrecognised republic. An 
essential ingredient has been the support of businesses and non-
Somali donors for one of the most vibrant cultural events in East 
Africa. Their contributions make it possible to stage the festival 
annually – and for free. Huge crowds are drawn, none more so than 
for the recitals of the renowned Somali poet Mohamed Ibrahim 
Warsame “Hadraawi”. The Somali Horn of Africa is one of the few 
places where a poet is able to attain the cultural status elsewhere 
reserved for rock stars and footballers. 
The festival and a new Somali Cultural Centre in Hargeysa are not 
simply indications of cultural tolerance and vibrancy. In the eyes of 
many Somalilanders and visitors their success is representative of 
the dynamic and stable political environment in Somaliland.
There is a strong temptation to  
romanticise Somaliland’s stability
International perceptions of Somaliland are usually influenced by 
– or contrasted with – the ebbs and flows of political dysfunction 
in southern Somalia. Since the start of 2014, two major military 
offensives from AMISOM, the African Union force in Somalia, have 
pushed militant Islamist group al-Shabaab out of all major towns 
in the south. A US drone attack on September 1st killed the group’s 
leader, Ahmed Abdi “Godane”. These events have fuelled hope 
that the government in Muqdisho (Mogadishu) can consolidate 
its position and start to build the legitimacy its predecessors in 
the past two decades so sorely lacked. The political challenges 
remain daunting – and changeable. Military advances do not easily 
translate into social or political stability.
Amongst those who do retain an interest in the northern Somali 
Horn, there is a strong temptation to romanticise Somaliland’s 
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stability – built, as it has been for more than two decades, on a 
deep popular commitment to the avoidance of violence. This 
narrative glosses over numerous difficulties and shortcomings. 
Somaliland’s relative success is not unalloyed. Politics is as 
riven by clan patronage and division as it has ever been. Major 
challenges lie ahead in registering voters, holding parliamentary 
and presidential elections, and determining an electoral system 
for the upper house or Guurti. Women and minority groups are 
excluded from most formal political participation apart from voting, 
and some Somalilanders are growing increasingly disillusioned 
with a secessionist “project” that remains incomplete and fragile.
Democracy, a messy business 
No society can sustain the high hopes of those who prefer to 
see only the positive. One of the key failings of many observers, 
both Somali and foreign, has been a cavalier willingness to adopt 
rhetoric that embraces only those aspects of Somali history and 
culture that either add conveniently to a narrative of unique success 
and stability, or are seemingly evidence of the binary opposite – 
chaos and disorder. If we are to offer effective support to Somalis 
committed to building a reasonably inclusive and prosperous 
future in the Horn, it is vital that we recognise both the challenges 
and the foundations on which such success is built.
No society can sustain the high hopes of  
those who prefer to see only the positive
Politics is always a messy business, but it remains essential despite 
its persistent failure to satisfy idealistic – or simply unrealistic – 
yearnings. Building on success tends to be slow, painstaking, 
erratic and unpredictable. Of these characteristics, only the last 
two are applicable to the charged dynamism and breakneck speed 
of political change in southern Somalia. In Somaliland’s case, there 
is a tendency to depict the territory’s political trajectory as having 
started in earnest in 1991. This reading takes the fall of General 
Mohamed Siyaad Barre’s government in Muqdisho as the starting 
point, with that regime’s egregious abuse of human rights, and most 
particularly the wholesale destruction of Somaliland’s two biggest 
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cities,  as the prima facie justification for the unilateral restoration of 
the sovereignty that Somaliland enjoyed for five days in 1960. 
While each of these facts about Somaliland is correct, and the 
brutality of the Siyaad Barre regime genuinely horrific, collectively 
they tell only half the story. Importantly, selective and simplistic 
historicising does not fundamentally challenge one of the key 
tropes used to describe Somali political development: that of a 
people “addicted to congenital egalitarian anarchy”.1 In leaving that 
presumption somehow unchallenged, Somaliland is presented as 
exceptional rather than as the latest example of Somali political 
stability grounded in compromise, conflict and accommodation in 
the context of a complex set of socio-cultural institutions.
For adherents to this incomplete narrative, Somaliland is remarkable 
as the first Somali territory to establish a state that is widely 
accepted as providing, in principle and practice, approximately 
legitimate democratic government evidenced, in particular, by 
periodic and largely successful elections. Conversely, sceptics 
castigate the territory for failing to meet the exacting standards of 
the perfectly representative state. Dissatisfaction amongst some 
regarding its legitimacy is advanced as proof of the argument.
Somaliland’s progress has been impressive in many ways. 
Successive governments in Hargeysa have had to build legitimacy 
through a series of clan-based conferences held since late 1990. 
Those governments gradually consolidated their hold on power, 
but remained sufficiently weak that each needed to secure the 
support of a substantial portion of the population in order to 
remain in office. Elections for local councils have been held twice 
(in 2002 and 2012), as has a popular vote for the president (in 
2003 and 2010) and for parliamentary seats (in 2005).  One of the 
presidential elections which resulted in defeat for the incumbent 
by the narrowest of margins was followed by a peaceful handover 
of power within the constitutionally stipulated timeframe.2
There were snags with some of these elections. The local council 
election in 2012, for example, was accompanied by widespread 
multiple and underage voting.3 But each achieved the objective of 
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providing a mechanism for political contestation in an environment 
that was largely peaceful. That is a major achievement by any 
standard. The shortcoming of the exceptionalist narrative is not 
that Somaliland’s progress is disputed. It lies in misapprehensions 
about the political process itself and the common inclination to 
equate the term “democratisation” with elections.
Transition, not exceptionalism
Somali society is conspicuously democratic. Adult Somali males are 
used to a consensus-based system that allows them full participation 
in decision-making on all key issues. That system is both highly 
inclusive – for men – and slow and cumbersome. It is not dissimilar 
to the type of discursive democracy practised in the city states of 
ancient Athens. While this form of political participation is rightly 
criticised for excluding women, and for being crisis driven – it takes a 
crisis to get everyone together and focused on the problem at hand 
– it cannot reasonably be described as undemocratic. Unless, of 
course, our definition of democracy is so idealised as to apply only 
when all problems of exclusion have first been resolved.
Somaliland’s laudable success is  
not one of democratisation at all
In fact, Somaliland’s laudable success is not one of democratisation 
at all. It is one in which most adult males are being asked to 
relinquish some of their traditional right to participate in decision-
making to allow for a system of representation that permits greater 
responsiveness and speed, while also holding out the possibility 
of meaningful inclusion of women and of clan groups who have 
customarily been excluded. This process is not unnecessary or 
undesirable. If Somalis are to operate effectively in a globally 
connected world of nation states, multinational corporations and 
powerful international lobbies and agencies, they need a system 
of representative politics that confers the agility and strength to 
negotiate and participate effectively. If the benefits of engagement 
with the institutions and representatives of international trade and 
finance are to be shared reasonably equitably, then it is also vital 
that inclusive politics provides opportunities for Somali citizens to 
select their representatives – and remove those who are ineffective.
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While elections are therefore instrumentally important, so is an 
understanding of the established, discursive system of democracy. 
This helps to explain why it has been very hard to find a way for 
Somali women, so vigorously active in business and all other 
spheres of Somali life, to participate fully in politics. It also explains 
why Somalilanders, no less than other Somalis, are quick to become 
disillusioned with their politicians. People whom they would once 
have called to account frequently are now installed in office for five 
years at a time – or longer when inevitable electoral extensions occur. 
In one of the key Somaliland peace conferences – that held in 
Booraame (Borama) town in 1993 – the chair was noted for urging 
delegates that “voting is fighting; let’s opt for consensus”.4 For 
many Somalis, consensus-based politics remains the baseline 
that informs often unspoken understandings of the ideal nature of 
democracy. It is unsurprising that the representative politics of the 
nation state – internationally recognised or not – frequently falls far 
short of that standard.
A history of Somali state-building
A highly selective application of history is also deployed by sceptics 
to justify the view that Somalis are ill equipped to operate within the 
confines set by a system of state. Somaliland has achieved a great deal 
in consolidating governmental institutions that enjoy broad, if qualified, 
support. Yet it is not the first successful Somali state, and it is incorrect 
to view Somali society as naturally inclined to anarchy or chaos. 
Throughout the past millennium, the Somali Horn of Africa has had 
vibrant trading ports that periodically spawned or supported systems 
of government. By the mid-14th century, there were a number 
of successful and stable trading cities on the long Somali coast, 
marking the start of a period of at least 200 years of considerable 
prosperity. One account identifies at least 20 such towns on the Gulf 
of Aden coast and in the immediate northern hinterland alone.5
Several notable empires were founded on the wealth of coastal 
trading centres. In the north, the Walashma dynasty built the 
powerful and long-lived Adal Sultanate, with Seylac its commercial 
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heart and a settlement close to Harar, in today’s eastern Ethiopia, its 
political centre. Although the sultanate was identified primarily as a 
Muslim rather than a Somali empire, there is little doubt that Somalis 
comprised a significant proportion of its population. The 16th-century 
Adal military leader Ahmed Ibrahim al-Ghazi “Gurey” is still revered 
amongst many Somalis as the first great Somali nationalist.
It is incorrect to view Somali society as 
naturally inclined to anarchy or chaos
It is certain, despite a dearth of authoritative documentation of the 
period, that the Adal Sultanate enjoyed great wealth and considerable 
territorial control for at least three centuries. Initially it lived at peace 
with its highland Ethiopian neighbours, with whom it enjoyed 
extensive trading links, but the relationship grew tense as both 
sides developed aggressive territorial ambitions. A long period of 
intermittent trade links and conflict saw huge territorial fluctuations 
as the Adal Sultanate seized or lost ground to successive highland 
rulers. Only when the Ethiopian emperor Galawdewos secured the 
support of the Portuguese, as “fellow Christians”, against Ahmed 
Gury, who received some backing from the Ottoman empire in what 
was explicitly framed by both sides as a struggle between Islamic 
and Christian armies, did the balance of power alter decisively. The 
Adal forces were roundly defeated on the shores of Lake Tana in 1542, 
forcing the sultanate into a period of terminal decline. 
The Adal Sultanate was one of the most famous of early Somali 
states, but by no means the only one. The Ajuuraan and Geledi 
Sultanates in southern Somalia are other prominent examples of 
distinctively or predominantly Somali governance enduring over 
long periods of time.
Somaliland, a Somali nation state
Somaliland enjoys neither the territorial expanse nor the longevity 
of most of the earlier Somali states. Its uniqueness therefore lies not 
in its novelty as a resilient Somali state, nor in its democracy, but in 
its success in building a durable and broadly representative system 
of government within the borders of a contemporary nation state.
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During the colonial era in the 20th century, Somali “states” did not 
allow the involvement of Somalis in governance. Colonial territories 
could not by any stretch be described as Somali nation states. The 
representative democracy ushered in by independence in 1960 and 
the exuberance of reunification of the British Somaliland Protectorate 
and Somalia Italiana was lively and vital. It was also chaotic and riven 
by clan division and dispute. The first attempted coup occurred 18 
months later. A mere nine years on, Siyaad Barre’s coup was greeted 
with relief by a population already disillusioned by the winner-takes-
all nature of elections and representative politics. 
Siyaad Barre’s government began with a surge of reforming zeal. 
Clans were symbolically abolished and women were encouraged to 
play a full part in politics. Again, dissatisfaction followed in short order 
and, in an effort to retain power, the general was forced to exploit 
the very clan affiliations he had denounced. Desperate to keep his 
government in place, in 1977–8 he used a war against Ethiopia to rally 
his population. Defeat left him with few other options, and he steadily 
lost power even as he resorted to increasingly brutal repression in an 
effort to retain it. The insurrection that finally ended his rule started not 
in Somaliland, but amongst the Majerteen of what is now Puntland. 
This series of events underscores the point that while Somaliland 
is not the first successful Somali state, and did not introduce 
democratisation to the region, it is the first successfully to combine 
electoral democracy with nation state government. That is no 
mean feat, albeit neither the unqualified success nor unacceptable 
imposition of centralised and clan-based hegemony that are the 
dichotomous opposites frequently suggested by observers. 
The establishment of any nation state is inevitably accompanied by 
debate and dissatisfaction over critical issues such as citizenship. 
Not all who reside within a state’s borders will be happy to be 
regarded as citizens. In some areas of what was once British 
Somaliland, particularly the easternmost, a significant proportion 
of the population is emphatically unwilling to be classified as 
Somaliland citizens. This is certainly not a trivial objection, and it 
remains to be seen how it will be resolved. But it barely detracts 
from the importance of Somaliland’s success in other respects. 
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Often derided by critics as a one-clan state, Somaliland is in fact far 
from that. Although dominated by the large Isaaq clan, this is a clan 
grouping rather than a single, united lineage. The socio-political 
system requires support from a number of non-Isaaq clans: for 
example to bolster constituencies within the divided Isaaq group. 
Indeed, it was when the Isaaq clans started fighting each other 
in the early 1990s, once the unifying spectre of the Muqdisho 
autocracy had vanished, that many other clans gained confidence 
that Somaliland would not turn out to be an Isaaq hegemony.
Federalism, autonomy and the prospects for representative transition 
If Somaliland’s transition is not one of democratisation, then, 
but of progression from a patriarchal, discursive democracy to a 
more inclusive, representative one, that is a transition which could 
usefully be replicated elsewhere in the region. It is precisely what 
is currently being negotiated in Puntland, albeit with less success 
to date. Southern Somalis too are being urged in a similar direction 
by a heavily invested group of international donors, diplomats and 
major NGOs.
There is little hope that Puntland will achieve a planned return 
to electoral politics, following the cancellation of its first popular 
election – for local council representatives – in mid-2013, unless 
there is a greater understanding of precisely the transition that is 
required. There is even less prospect that the ambitious roadmap 
for the south, which anticipates a constitutional referendum in 2015 
followed by full elections in 2016, will succeed in the absence of a 
more nuanced understanding.
“Federalism” means so many wildly divergent  
things to Somalis and non-Somalis alike that 
it is in effect a meaningless term
Many Somali observers have for years been calling for a return to 
the sort of local peace-building that worked so well in Somaliland. 
That process does not necessarily need to replace completely the 
Muqdisho-centred efforts that have dominated for some time. But 
the ejection of al-Shabaab from most southern Somali towns and 
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villages provides a real opportunity to transfer some of the ample 
investment in top-down federal reconstruction to a more localised 
reconciliation process that allows Somalis throughout Somalia to 
make the critical decisions about their political future. If the rhetoric 
from donors about providing support for “Somali-led solutions” is 
to carry any meaning, it is in precisely this kind of shift.
The difficulty is that this approach will be slow and the results 
unpredictable – as has been the case in Somaliland. However, 
without the kinds of local agreements generated by such a process, 
there is little hope that the always heated and often hysterical 
debates on federalism and elections will lead to the establishment 
of durable political systems.
“Federalism” means so many wildly divergent things to Somalis and 
non-Somalis alike that it is in effect a meaningless term. Puntland’s 
leaders argue for a version that accords so much autonomy to the 
constituent parts of the Somali state they hope even Somaliland 
might be tempted back into the fold.6 Their federal Somalia would 
look more like a multi-state free trade zone than a single nation. 
President Hassan Sheikh, meanwhile, has modified his centralising 
inclinations only slightly, still preferring a far stronger Muqdisho 
government than many outside the capital are willing to countenance.
Future Somaliland
If it is to be peaceable and to consolidate progress, Somaliland’s own 
future will require agreement on some deeply contentious issues. 
Parliamentary elections are five years late, and now scheduled to 
be held in the middle of 2015 – at which stage a presidential election 
is also due. Before any elections can take place, a much delayed 
process of registering voters must be completed in tandem with a 
civil registration. The last attempt at voter registration, in 2008-9, was 
so deeply divisive that it brought the country to the brink of conflict.7
If we bear in mind the transition that Somaliland is making, it is not 
surprising that it has proved extremely difficult to count voters. 
The last Somali census was conducted in the final years of Siyaad 
Barre’s regime, and so threatened to upset the balance of clan 
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power that the results were never released. The Somaliland count 
carried the same risk of endangering established agreements 
on clan representation, and it is inevitable that a new effort at 
registration will be fraught with similar dangers. It is possible 
that the experience of the 2012 local elections – which prompted 
widespread recognition that the lack of an electoral register was 
a key factor in enabling multiple voting on a massive scale – has 
focused minds in a way that will permit the exercise to be conducted 
without provoking a crisis this time round. But caution, patience 
and sensitivity aplenty will be required.
Somaliland’s own future will require agreement 
on some deeply contentious issues
The situation in the east of Somaliland also seems to be heading 
steadily towards some sort of denouement. In the areas around 
Buuhoodle town and throughout most of Sool region, the competition 
between Somaliland, Puntland and the nascent, Dhulbahante-
based regional state, Khaatumo, is becoming increasingly intense. 
To date, a systematised ambiguity has operated in which each of 
the interested parties has simultaneously laid claim to the area and 
operated more or less as though that claim had substance. It is not 
inconceivable that this ambiguity could be maintained, but it seems 
less and less likely. For one thing, there are hopes that commercial 
quantities of oil will be found in the Nugaal Valley, which runs 
through Sool. Everyone wants to lay unambiguous claim to that.
It is imperative that those wishing to support continued political 
development in Somaliland and throughout the region take full 
cognisance of looming threats as well as past successes. An 
appreciation of the historical and cultural context in which recent 
political development has occurred is equally essential. This, of 
course, applies just as much to non-Somalis in diplomatic, donor 
and development communities as it does to diaspora Somalis and 
those in the Somali Horn.
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